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ABSTRAK 
Kajian ini mengkaji kelakuan jangka pendek saham disenaraikan di papan utama 
Bursa Malaysia sepanjang tempoh Januari 2000 hingga Disember 2007. Kajian ini 
mempunyai tiga objektif, iaitu untuk menentukan sama ada fenomena saham-saham 
Malaysia bertindak melampaui batas pengembalian berlaku; menentukan jika para 
pelabur boleh mengaut keuntungan dari mengeksploitasi anomali ini, serta 
menentukan jika keuntungan yang berlebihan diperoleh sekiranya menggabungkan 
kos urusniaga.  
  
Penemuan penyelidikan ini bercampur. Pembalikan harga saham diperhati 
apabila membandingkan tempoh secara keseluruhannya, tetapi keputusan statistik 
menunjukkan ia adalah tidak penting. Oleh itu, kajian ini membuat kesimpulan 
bahawa kelakuan saham melampaui batas pengembalian dalam satu kitaran normal 
dengan kurang pergolakan disebabkan oleh krisis pasaran, tidak berlaku.  Kajian ini 
adalah relevan terhadap pelabur dan penganalisis yang mungkin ingin menkaji 
bagaimana pergerakkan pasaran saham  dalam kitaran yang berlainan. Oleh itu, kajian 
ini menyediakan satu perbandingan dengan keputusan kajian lain dalam dua jangka 
waktu, iaitu pada dekad yang lepas yang melibatkan tempoh krisis kewangan dan 
tempoh masa kini, iaitu selepas tempoh krisis kewangan. Keputusan menunjukkan 
bahawa semasa tempoh bullis, hanya jangka waktu sebelum krisis kewangan 
menunjukkan saham bertindak melampaui batas pegembalian.  Sebaliknya, ketika 
waktu bearis, hanya tempoh masa selepas krisis menunjukkan keuntungan yang 
berlebihan. Oleh itu, kajian ini membuat kesimpulan ketika kitaran normal dan jangka 
waktu bullis kitaran normal, pasaran Malaysia adalah efisien. Ketika jangka waktu 
berris kitaran normal, pasaran saham menunjukkan saham bertindak melampaui batas. 
x 
ABSTRACT 
This study empirically investigates the short-term behaviour of stocks listed on 
the main board of Bursa Malaysia during the period of January 2000 to December 
2007. The objectives were to determine whether the overreaction phenomenon occurs 
during this time frame as well as assert whether investors can profit by exploiting this 
anomaly and further extend the investigations to determine if the excess profits would 
be feasible after incorporating transaction costs.    
  
The findings of this research provide mixed results. Price reversals were 
observed when comparing the period as a whole, but the results were not statistically 
significant. It was concluded that during a normal cycle with less turbulence caused 
by a crisis, the market did not portray traces of overreaction. As a matter of relevance 
to investors and analysts who might want to gauge how the market moves during 
different cycles, this research provides a comparison of the findings during two time 
frames, the past decade that involves the financial crisis period with the current post 
crisis period or normal cycle. The results signify that during the bullish period, only 
the loser portfolio exhibited reversals whereas the winner portfolio exhibited 
momentum during the pre-crisis period. On the contrary, during the bearish period, 
only the post crisis period seems to exhibit overreaction with significant excess 
profits. Thus, this study concludes that during normal cycle and the bullish period of a 
normal cycle, the Malaysian market can be considered to be weak form efficient. 
During the bearish period of the normal cycle, the market shows some signs of 
reversals for the winner and arbitrage portfolios and the study attributes these findings 
to overreaction. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction  
Since the introduction of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) by Eugene 
Fama in 1970, it has sparked a great deal of empirical research that supports and 
contradicts the notion that financial asset prices rapidly and fully reflect all available 
information. Most research conducted on market efficiency examined the validity of 
weak form efficiency prediction that prices follow a random walk (Megginson, Smart, 
and Gitman, 2007). One such cluster of research that received great review is return 
predictability.  
 
The popular interpretation of return predictability emphasized by many 
researchers is the tendency for stock-price changes to continue from one period to the 
next, which means that positive returns tend to follow positive returns in subsequent 
periods and vice versa (known as momentum studies); as well as the tendency for 
stock-price changes to reverse direction, where positive returns tend to be followed by 
negative returns in subsequent periods and vice versa (known as price reversal or 
overreaction). If these anomalous patterns could be identified and exploited 
profitably, it would contradict the efficient markets hypothesis and imply that markets 
are grossly inefficient, allowing simplistic or mechanical trading rules to offer 
arbitrageurs a window of profit opportunities.  
 
It should be noted that stocks movement in the short-, medium-, and long-return 
horizons differ. Underreaction (momentum strategy) is particularly pervasive during 
the medium horizons especially during the 6-month and 12-month period. For 
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example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that a momentum strategy, which selects 
stocks based on their past 6 month returns and holds them for 6 months, realizes a 
compounded excess return of 12.01% per year on average in the U.S.  Overreaction 
on the other hand, has been found to be particularly pervasive in short horizons 
(weekly to monthly) and long horizons (3 to 5 years) (Iihara, Kato and Tokunaga, 
2004). 
 
Though both underreaction and overreaction phenomenon are an exciting area 
of research, this study attempts to analyze short-term overreaction in the Bursa 
Malaysia during the period of January 2000 through December 2007. Test for stock 
market underreaction though seems intriguing; is beyond the scope of this research. 
The following topics introduces the research outline of the study, which illustrates the 
background of the study, problem statement, research objectives, research questions, 
definition of key terms and concludes the chapter with significance of the study.  
 
1.2 Background of the Study 
For almost forty years, the efficient market hypothesis has been one of the most 
imperative and prominent themes in financial research. One of the major implications 
of the EMH is that stock prices are not predictable and information quickly 
assimilates into stock prices. In other words, the EMH view financial markets as 
being efficient and prices of securities should reflect their intrinsic values.  
 
Lately, there have been proliferations of research questioning the validity of the 
EMH. These researchers believe security prices could diverge from their fundamental 
values especially due to evidence of return reversal behaviour of stock prices. Since 
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the most influential findings by De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) on stock market 
overreaction, this area of research has gained great momentum over the years.  
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) define the overreaction hypothesis as overresponse 
to new information. This means that investors tend to overweight recent information 
and underweight prior information. More emphasis is placed upon short-run economic 
developments that generate price movements beyond the new equilibrium level that is 
justified by the news (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). As a result of this systematic 
investor overreaction, this hypothesis suggests that when prices overreact, stocks are 
pushed beyond their fundamental values and extreme movements in stock prices will 
be followed by subsequent price movements in the opposite direction to ―correct‖ the 
initial overreaction. That is, when the market perceives the misevaluation of stocks in 
relation to their fundamental values and take corrective measures or actions, prices 
revert back to equilibrium in a predictable manner thereby showing a mean-reverting 
pattern on share returns.  This implies that securities that have abnormally high 
returns in the past (winners) will subsequently experience relatively low returns in the 
future; whereas securities that have abnormally low returns (losers) in the past will 
later experience relatively higher returns. In addition, this hypothesis affirms that the 
more extreme the magnitude of initial price movement, the greater will be the 
subsequent adjustment (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985).  
 
To test this conjecture, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in their seminal study tested 
the empirical validity of the overreaction hypothesis using monthly returns of 
common stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange during the period of January 
1926 to December 1982. They found evidence of overreaction as the loser portfolio 
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outperforms the market by 19.6% and the winner portfolio earn about 5% less than 
the market. As a result, they found substantial weak form market inefficiencies where 
the contrarian strategy of buying loser shares and selling winner shares short, 
investors can earn significant return of 24.6%. Their findings suggest that the stock 
market overreacts to relevant news and provides arbitrageurs an opportunity to make 
abnormal profits.  
 
The findings of De Bondt and Thaler (1985) contradicts the conventional school 
of thought in finance and caused a stir in the academic world especially hard core 
believers of the EMH, which then spawned two streams of literature. The first stream 
of literature supports the notion of market inefficiency due to the evidence of 
systematic reversal patterns in stock returns in the long-term as well as short-term.  
 
For example, in the short-term, Lehmann (1990) employed a one-week 
contrarian strategy for securities listed on the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges from the year 1962 to 1990. He rejected the efficient market hypothesis 
due to evidence that portfolio of securities that had positive returns in one week had 
reversed to negative returns in the week after (–0.35 to –0.55% per week on average) 
and the opposite is true for portfolio of securities with negative returns in one week 
had reversed to positive returns in the week after (0.86 to 1.24% per week on 
average). Chou, Wei and Chung (2007) studied the performance of contrarian strategy 
across various ranking and holding horizons from 1 month (short-term) to 3 years 
(long-term) for stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1975 to 1997. They 
found that contrarian strategies are profitable for very short (1 month) and very long 
(2 years or longer) ranking and holding horizons. Other literature that supports the 
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notion that the market is inefficient includes Bowman and Iverson (1998); Bremer and 
Sweeney (1991); Chiao and Hueng (2005); De Bondt and Thaler (1987); Dhouib and 
Abaoub (2007); Howe (1986); Iihara et al. (2004); Renshaw (1984); and Richards 
(1997) to name a few. 
 
The second stream of literature supports the notion of market efficiency and 
argues that the reversal patterns are attributable to imprecise measurement of risk, size 
effect, seasonality, as well as failure to incorporate transaction cost (Assoe and Sy, 
2003; Atkins and Dyl, 1990; and Chan, 1988; Jones, 1987; and Zarowin, 1990).   
 
For example, Chan (1988) claims that the risks of winner and loser stocks are 
not constant over time where loser stocks become riskier at the end of the formation 
period due to increase in financial and operational leverage as well as loss of 
economies of scale. He replicated De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) research and showed 
that large changes in betas from the rank period to the test period where losers’ betas 
increase with an average gain of 0.231; winners’ betas decrease with an average of 
0.222 and arbitrage portfolio (losers-winners) with an average gain of 0.453. Thus, 
when risk changes are controlled, they found only small abnormal returns of –
0.095%, –0.229% and 0.133% per month for the loser, winner and arbitrage portfolios 
which were not significant. 
 
Zarowin (1990) claims that the superior performance of loser portfolio over 
winner portfolio in many of the overreaction literatures is not caused by investor 
overreaction but due to size discrepancies between winners and losers. He explains 
that losers are usually smaller firms since they have lost market value relative to 
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winners. Zarowin (1990) replicated De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) research with 
control for size differences between winners and losers during the period of January 
1927 to 1977. His results revealed that losers outperform winners only in January with 
Jensen’s alpha estimate of 0.017, which is consistent with the January phenomenon 
but not with the overreaction phenomenon because outside of January (February to 
December, Jensen’s alpha estimate = –0.0001), there is no difference between the 
performance of losers and winners.  
 
Atkins and Dyl (1990) examined the behaviour of three common stocks that 
exhibited largest percentage loss and three with largest percentage gain during a 
single trading day and found there is evidence of overreaction but the magnitude of 
overreaction is relatively small compared to transaction cost. The average bid-ask 
spread for the sample of stock for large price decline was 3.57%, which was much 
larger than the 2.26% two-day abnormal return found for these stocks. They 
concluded that the market is efficient after incorporating transaction cost.  
 
So far the evidence discussed above is mainly from the U.S. It should be noted 
that ―winner-loser‖ reversal is not restricted to the U.S., as evidence have been found 
in many Asian countries. For example, Iihara et al. (2004) who found significant short 
horizon (1 month) return reversals for stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
during the period of 1975 to 1997. Ratner and Leal (1998) examined daily index 
returns from 1982 to 1995 for ten of the largest emerging markets which include 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Taiwan and 
Thailand. They found reversals occurring in some emerging markets such as Korea, 
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Thailand, Argentina and Mexico with weak evidence of reversal at the 10% level of 
significance.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The overreaction phenomenon provides an interesting area of research as it has 
implications towards the weak form EMH and argues informational inefficiency 
where past returns can be used to predict future returns. If this is the case, then the 
outcome of this hypothesis is that mechanical trading rules could be used to earn 
arbitrage profits.  
  
In Malaysia, there have been several researches that documented the 
overreaction phenomenon and provide evidence that the financial markets are not 
completely efficient. Studies conducted by Ahmad and Tjan (2004); Hameed and 
Ting (2000); Lai (2002); Lai, Krishnan and Mat Nor (2003); Mohd Arifin and Power 
(1996) and Nam, Pyun and Kim (2003) found that overreaction does exist and 
attributes the phenomenon to investor sentiments such as overconfidence and 
irrationality.  
 
However, the problem remains that most analysis conducted in Malaysia to test 
for market overreaction was conducted in the past decade, roughly during the period 
of 1989 to 1999. Most of the research conducted during this period was to gauge the 
effect of overreaction during the bullish period prior to the financial crisis (January 
1992 to December 1993) and the bearish period during and after the financial crisis 
(July 1997 to July 1999). The movement of the KLCI before and after the financial 
crisis is captured in Figure 1.1 below. According to Okposin and Cheng (2000) as 
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cited in Lai (2002), the KLCI dropped by 75.65% to the level of 262.70 points over 
1st July 1997 to 1st September 1998. Ahmad and Tjan (2004) reported that during 
July to December 1997,  the reversals observed in the Malaysian stock market was 
much more pronounced especially for the winner portfolio that exhibited excess 
returns of  –8.24% (t-statistic = 8.289). Due to the fact that the Malaysian stock 
market is less sophisticated compared to developed nations, speculations frequently 
occurs and price trends tend to be influenced by rumours and as a result exhibited 
overreaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) during 1993-2007 
Source : Thomson Financial DataStream 
 
But the question remains, how will the Malaysian market fair during a normal 
cycle as shown by the upward trend of the KLCI during the period of 2000 to 2007 in 
Figure 1.1 above? Would investors be able to find the same pattern of reversals as 
documented by research conducted during the 1990s?  
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Normal Cycle 
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It would be interesting to assess the market during a normal cycle where there is 
less disturbance created by a crisis. This is due to the fact that a crisis, especially the 
one experienced during the Asian financial crisis, does not occur very frequently and 
most of the time, the market portrays a normal cycle where prices do not show very 
rapid changes with the usual peaks and retracements of the KLCI. The information 
provided by this research can be used by investors and analysts alike to make 
decisions on how to go about investing during similar periods in the future.  
 
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, Malaysia is now entering the 
phase of readjustment and heading towards strong economic fundamentals. Thus, this 
research fills the gap by examining the overreaction phenomenon during the post-
crisis period of 2000 to 2007. As a result, this research provides information to the 
average investor as well as analyst who might want to gauge how the market moves 
during a normal cycle as well as use the information provided to benchmark against 
other periods, not only the period covered by this study, to determine whether 
overreaction phenomenon occurs during a normal cycle. Thus, when a market falls 
into a crisis period or when the market recovers after the crisis in the future, investors 
can use the data from this research as well as data from prior research during the 
1990s to provide an understanding of the movement of stocks and plan their 
investment strategy accordingly instead of plugging in based on pure instinct alone.     
 
If the overreaction hypothesis holds true during a normal cycle period, another 
prevailing issue should be taken into consideration. Can investors make contrarian 
profits by simply observing the patterns in the market? Will these patterns be 
consistent over time? For an arbitrageur, the objective would be to discover patterns 
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and anomalies such as price reversals using simple trading rules to ensure the 
possibility to earn as much abnormal profits particularly in the short-term.  
 
There have been some discrepancies in this area. Ahmad and Tjan (2004) 
examined the incurrence of short-term overreaction in the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange from January to December 1997. Their findings conclude that some degree 
of reversals do occur when comparing performance of winner and loser portfolios 
from the ranking period to the test period, but taking advantage of the reversals using 
contrarian strategy seems futile because it does not offer positive excess returns, 
which verifies similar findings by Mohd Arifin and Power (1996).  Lai (2002) on the 
contrary, assert that contrarian strategy yield significant returns. For example, the 
arbitrage portfolio for the 12-month contrarian strategy revealed to be the most 
profitable with a return of 21.97%. It would be interesting to conduct more analysis 
during a more recent period to shed some light into this matter.  
 
Another factor that should be considered when evaluating contrarian strategy is 
transaction cost which involves the bid-ask spread. As mentioned earlier, Atkins and 
Dyl (1990) found that there is evidence of overreaction but the magnitude of 
overreaction is relatively small compared to the bid-ask spread. They concluded that 
the market is efficient after incorporating the bid-ask spread. Assoe and Sy (2003) and 
Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) came to the same conclusion. Assoe and Sy (2003) 
mentions that though the winner, loser and arbitrage portfolio show signs of reversals, 
but exploiting this anomaly does not yield excess profits after the incorporation of 
transactions cost. Hameed and Ting (2000) on the contrary, assert that the contrarian 
strategy yields significant trading profits in the Malaysian stock market of 0.12% per 
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month. It should be noted that Hameed and Ting (2004) used a different methodology 
proposed by Lehmann (1990) which is discussed in Section 2.2.2.   
 
Taking into consideration all the factors mentioned above, therefore this study 
attempts to provide empirical evidence on the short-term overreaction phenomenon as 
test for market efficiency of stock prices listed on the Bursa Malaysia during the 
period of January 2000 to December 2007. Further, this research attempts to 
determine whether exploiting these anomalous patterns using simplistic or mechanical 
trading rules offer arbitrageurs abnormal profits as well as resolve the issue whether 
these profits will still be prevalent or diminish after incorporating transaction cost.  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
As mentioned earlier, the occurrence of the overreaction phenomenon has been 
documented in Malaysia but most of the studies were focused towards the past decade 
especially during the pre-crisis and crisis period with little empirical research 
examining it during post-crisis period. It would be interesting to compare the results 
of more recent findings with those from the past to gain more understanding on price 
movements of stocks and market efficiency. Thus, the first objective of this study will 
look into the overreaction phenomenon by examining short-term behaviour of 
common stocks listed on the Bursa Malaysia over the period of January 2000 to 
December 2007.  
 
If the overreaction hypothesis holds true during this period, the second objective 
of this study is to determine whether investors can exploit this anomaly to make 
contrarian profits by buying losers and short selling winners. The final objective that 
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this research desires to achieve is to determine whether contrarian profits are feasible 
after incorporating transaction cost.  
 
1.5 Research Questions 
In order to achieve the research objectives mentioned earlier, this study will try 
to answer the following research questions: 
1. Does the Malaysian stock market exhibit overreaction in the short-term for the 
period of 2000 to 2007? 
2. Could investors earn contrarian profits by exploiting the overreaction 
anomaly? 
3. If investors could earn contrarian profits, will these profits be significant after 
incorporating transaction cost? 
 
1.6 Definition of Key Terms 
This section describes the definition of key terms used in this study.  
1.6.1 Market efficiency 
Market efficiency refers to the tendency of stock prices in a market to rapidly 
and fully incorporate new and relevant information (Megginson et al., 2007). 
1.6.2 Anomalies 
Patterns of returns than seem to contradict the efficient market hypothesis 
(Bodie, Kane, and Marcus, 2005). 
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1.6.3 Price reversal 
The behaviour of stock prices where positive returns tend to be followed by 
negative returns in subsequent periods and vice versa (De Bondt and Thaler, 
1985).  
1.6.4 Abnormal return 
Return on a stock beyond what would be predicted by market movements 
alone. Abnormal return for a given security is the difference between the 
return observed and the expected return (Atkins and Dyl, 1990). 
1.6.5 Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
The cumulative abnormal return is the total abnormal return for the period 
surrounding an announcement or the release of information (Bodie, et al., 
2005). 
1.6.6 Contrarian strategy 
Contrarian strategy is the purchase of securities that have performed poorly in 
the past and the short sell securities that have performed well to earn positive 
expected profits (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990).  
1.6.7 Bid-ask spread 
Bid-ask spread represent the minimum cost of transacting which refers to the 
difference between a dealer’s bid and asked price (Bodie, et al. 2005). 
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1.7 Significance of the Study 
Academically, fewer propositions in economics and finance are held with more 
fervour than the view that financial markets are efficient. Much literature supports the 
notion that markets are efficient even with the evidence of overreaction phenomenon. 
In the broad sense this study is significant in determining if asset prices of the local 
financial market fully reflect all historically available information as presented by the 
weak form efficient markets hypothesis.   
 
This study is also significant in a sense that it attempts to analyze the 
implications of price reversals, which is aimed at discovering arbitrage profits that 
could be earned if investors react in time by identifying anomalous  patterns of prior 
―winners and losers‖. Investors could take a long-position from prior loser stocks that 
have previously exhibited abnormal negative returns in anticipation that the losers 
will subsequently yield higher positive market-adjusted returns; or a short-position 
from prior winners that have previously exhibited abnormal positive returns in 
anticipation of a subsequent fall in price.  
 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, this research provides an opportunity to 
examine the Malaysian market during a normal cycle that is during the post-crisis 
period 2000 to 2007. The information can be used by the average investor who might 
want to gauge how the market moves during a normal cycle. Therefore, this study can 
be used as a guide by both analyst and investors to build their investment strategies 
accordingly.  
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   CHAPTER 2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) was first introduced by Eugene Fama in 
1970 with the notion that stock prices reflect all available information. Since then, the 
EMH provided the theoretical basis for many of the financial market research during 
the seventies and eighties which proved prices follow a random walk and the 
predictable variations in equity returns, if any, were found to be statistically 
insignificant. 
 
The major implication of the EMH is that all available information is quickly 
assimilated into stock prices. Thus, past price information cannot be used to predict 
future prices because prices follow a random walk and can be expressed as follows: 
E(Pt) = P0 + et 
Where, E(Pt) is the expected price of an asset in the next period (t>0) and P0 is the 
present price of the asset (t<0) and et is the random error term which has an expected 
value of zero. 
 
Fama (1970) further distinguished between three forms of the EMH: the weak, 
semi-strong and strong form of the hypothesis based on the type of information 
market prices reflect. The most extreme version of the EMH is the strong form of the 
hypothesis which suggests that prices reflect all available information, both public and 
private.  The semi-strong form of the EMH asserts that security prices reflect all 
publicly available information. When new information is released, it is fully 
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incorporated into stock prices and thus, technical trading rules of searching for 
undervalued or overvalued securities are incapable of generating abnormal returns. 
The weak form of the hypothesis implies that stock prices already reflect all historical 
information including past trends and as a consequence, using these price trends to 
predict future trends is deemed futile.  
 
Things took a turn lately, as there have been proliferations of research 
questioning the validity of the EMH.  Recent developments in behavioural finance 
have given rise to alternative hypotheses that contradict the efficient market 
hypothesis. One such hypothesis is the overreaction hypothesis brought forth by De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) as described in the previous chapter. The overreaction 
hypothesis suggests that stock prices moves in a predictable pattern and these patterns 
could be identified and exploited profitably by the average investor.   
 
As a result of the revelation of the overreaction hypothesis, it initiated two 
streams of literature; those that support the notion of market inefficiency due to 
evidence of systematic reversal patterns in stock returns in the long-term as well as 
short-term; as opposed to those that support the notion of market efficiency and 
argues that the reversal patterns are attributable to imprecise measurement of risk, size 
effect, seasonality as well as failure to include transaction cost.  
 
This chapter began with the introduction of the EMH as well as overreaction 
hypothesis. Next, this review attempts to analyze the substantive literature on 
overreaction phenomenon. It separates short-term from long-term effects of many 
market-based studies and considers the evidence of price reversals in a number of 
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countries.  This review also attempts to examine the outcomes usually associated with 
the overreaction effect to considerations of size, risk, seasonality and transaction cost. 
Finally, the summary will conclude this chapter.  
 
2.2 A Review of the Overreaction Phenomenon  
The overreaction hypothesis is defined as overresponse to new information 
based on the notion that many investors are poor Bayesian decision makers (De Bondt 
and Thaler, 1985). The Bayesian hypothesis states that individuals use conditional 
probabilities for changing beliefs on the basis of new information (Arnold and Baker, 
2007). In other words, when investors receive new information, they update their 
beliefs correctly, in a manner of using conditional probabilities. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1972) as cited in De Bondt and Thaler (1985) claim that such high levels of 
rationality are not an accurate characterization of how individuals behave when faced 
with new data.  
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) connected the findings of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1972) with stock market movements especially the occurrence of price reversals. 
Thus, the authors provided a new avenue of incorporating behavioural characteristics 
to explain an anomaly in finance. The overreaction hypothesis suggests that 
individuals when revising their beliefs tend to overweight recent information and 
underweight prior data. As a result, they overreact to recent unexpected, dramatic and 
salient news. When this happens, prices tend to overshoot their fundamental values. 
When investors realize that they have actually overreacted, they make corrective 
measures and soon the prices would revert back to equilibrium. Due to this, the 
hypothesis suggest that stock prices actually portray a mean-reversion pattern; that is, 
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extreme movements in stock prices will be followed by subsequent price movements 
in the opposite direction to correct the initial overreaction as well as the more extreme 
the magnitude of initial price movement, the greater will be the subsequent 
adjustment. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in their seminal study tested the empirical validity 
of the overreaction hypothesis using monthly returns of common stocks listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange during the period of January 1926 to December 1982. 
During the portfolio formation period, they ranked order the performance of stocks 
based on their three-year cumulative market-adjusted excess returns. The 35 stocks 
with the largest positive excess returns are assigned to the winner portfolio and 35 
stocks with the largest negative excess returns are placed in the loser portfolio. They 
then tracked the excess returns of both portfolios over the next 3-year period. They 
reported substantial weak form market inefficiencies as the simple strategy of buying 
loser shares and selling winner shares short, investors can earn substantial return of 
24. 6% —of which 19.6% is attributable to the appreciation of loser shares and 5% 
was the gain from short selling winner shares. They believed that the return was not 
significantly diminished by transaction costs associated with the purchase and the sale 
of these shares.  
 
Many issues regarding the overreaction effect in De Bondt and Thaler’s (1985) 
research were left unresolved especially the seasonality effect where large positive 
excess returns earned by the loser portfolio every January as well as other factors that 
might contribute to the overreaction effect  such as firm size and risk. To address 
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these issues, De Bondt and Thaler (1987) re-examined their 1985 research but this 
time incorporated the factors mentioned earlier.  
 
To address the seasonality effect, they examined the portfolio formation periods 
and found that for losers, there seems to be seasonal patterns that resemble that of the 
test period. They conclude that this finding is consistent with the magnitude effect 
brought forth by the overreaction hypothesis where extreme initial winners and losers 
exhibit extreme subsequent price reversals. Using Spearman rank correlations, they 
test the magnitude effect between the entire formation period and first five years of 
the test period and found that for the loser, the correlations are significantly different 
from zero indicating magnitude effect but the opposite seems to be true for the 
winners. In response to the change in risk of winner and loser stocks that are not 
constant over time; they regressed the annual arbitrage portfolio that finance the 
purchase of losers by selling winners short (RAt = RLt–RWt) on the market risk 
premium, (RAt = αA + βA (Rmt–Rft) + εAt) for each year of the trading strategy test 
period. The result of the study indicated that the coefficient on the market risk 
premium βA was 0.220 which implies that the beta of loser portfolio was larger than 
the beta of winner portfolio over the test period but they argued that the difference in 
risk was not sufficient to explain all of the return on the arbitrage portfolio, since the 
Jensen performance index measure, αA that measures the abnormal return on the 
trading strategy was statistically significant at 5.9% per month. As for the size effect, 
they formed portfolios based on quintiles and deciles and examined the performance 
of the portfolio in the test period. They conclude that even when portfolios are sorted 
based on size; the losers have positive excess returns whereas the winners have 
negative excess returns.  
20 
 The stock market overreaction hypothesis has been investigated over a wide 
array of time horizons. There are two varieties of the overreaction phenomenon, those 
observed in long-term and those observed in the short-term. The findings for both 
horizons will be discussed in the following subtopics. 
 
2.2.1 Long-Term Overreaction 
Other than the findings of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) discussed above, 
there are several other researchers who examined the long-term overreaction.  
Gunaratne and Yonesawa (1997) conducted a test for overreaction on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE) using monthly return data (including dividends) during the 
period of 1955 to 1990. They constructed 20 portfolios of equal number of stocks 
using a 2-year ranking period and analyzed the performance of the portfolios during 
the 4-year test period. They used the market model regression (rpt – rft = αp + βp (rmt – 
rft) + ept) proposed by Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) to compare the portfolios 
performance between the ranking period and test period. Their result indicated that 
return reversal behaviour is very strong phenomenon in the Japanese market. The 
highest performing winner portfolio (portfolio 1) showed a 3.573% decrease in its 
average monthly returns from the ranking to the test period. Conversely, the lowest 
performing loser portfolio (portfolio 20) showed a 2.727% increase. They further 
asserted that on average, ranking period losers have outperformed the ranking period 
winners by 1.105% (t = 4.921) per month during the test period. Over the four-year 
test period, losers outperform winners by about 54% in terms of total returns. Their 
research also revealed that a costless portfolio constructed with winners and losers at 
the beginning of the test period would earn 11.052% on average per annum in terms 
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of risk-adjusted abnormal returns. They conclude that the figure is substantial enough 
to justify economic significance of the overreaction effect.  
 
Starting January 1929 to December 1985, Loughran and Ritter (1996) ranked 
monthly returns of stocks listed on the American and New York Stock Exchange 
(AMEX and NYSE) with 36 continuous prior months of returns. During the 58 
overlapping three-year test period, the winner and loser portfolios include 35 firms 
each with the highest and lowest raw returns over the 36-month formation period 
respectively. The researchers used two different methodologies, CARs and holding 
periods returns to determine the ranking-period returns and to measure test period 
performance. Other than this, price and market capitalization data was also obtained 
on the last trading day of the formation period. Their results indicated loser stocks had 
reverted from –57% during the 3-year ranking period to 88.5% during the 3-year test 
period using the holding return method and 78.2% using the CARs method. The 
winner portfolio on the other hand, had reversed from 429.8% to 45.7% during the 3-
year test period using the holding return method and 40.7% using the CARs method.  
They conclude that there is little difference in test-period returns whether CARs or 
holding period returns are used. They also found that low-priced stocks had reverted 
from 10.4% during the ranking period to 102.2% during the test period and the 
opposite is true for high-priced stocks where it had reverted from 104.9% during the 
ranking period to 35.5% during the test period.  
 
Richards (1997) examined ―winner-loser reversals‖ using end-of month data 
from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MCSI) indices during the period of 
December 1969 to December 1995. Sixteen national stock market indices where 
22 
examined that include Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and U.S. The methodology that they adopted is somewhat similar to De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) but the focus was on return indices which were treated as 16 
different assets. Their research also differed from De Bondt and Thaler (1985) in 
several aspects such as using buy-and-hold returns as opposed to CARs; average 
portfolio returns were calculated using geometric average of the return relatives of all 
test outcomes; they used overlapping data as opposed to non-overlapping data to 
increase the statistical significance of the test and finally they used simulated 
measures such as bootstrapping  rather than theoretically derived critical values to 
asses the statistical significance of the returns on the contrarian portfolio.  
 
Their results indicated that 3- and 4-year horizons show the highest returns to 
the contrarian strategy with average annual returns of 6.4 and 5.8%. These results are 
due to return reversals for both winners and losers. They also do not support the 
notion that the reversals are due to risk differentials. During the test period, there is no 
evidence supporting the fact that prior losers were significantly riskier than prior 
winners either in terms of their standard deviations and their correlations with the 
world market return. However, there is evidence that winner-loser reversals were 
larger for smaller markets especially Norway and Denmark with differentials of 
23.5% and 16.8% per annum respectively. 
 
2.2.2 Short-Term Overreaction 
The short-run overreaction arises from investor’s reactions to unanticipated 
company news which may be good or bad. The reactions of the investors cause 
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temporary overshooting of the equilibrium value of the share price of the affected 
company (Power and Lonie, 1993). Researchers who have analysed the short-term 
overreaction effect have used a variety of possible portfolio formation and test 
periods, namely, daily, weekly and monthly. Using daily, monthly or weekly data, 
Atkins and Dyl (1990); Bowman and Iverson (1998); Chiao and Hueng (2005); Howe 
(1986); Iihara et al. (2004); Lehmann (1990); Renshaw (1984); Wang, Burton and 
Power (2004); and Zarowin (1989) show that reversal pattern exists in the shorter 
periods as well.  
 
Zarowin (1989) inspired by the long-run effect of size from his earlier research 
(but published later in 1990), investigated whether the same was true for the short-
run. He examined short-term overreaction in the U.S. during the period of October 
1927 to December 1985 by ranking stocks based on top and bottom deciles of their 1-
month average risk-adjusted returns and formed ten portfolios with portfolio 1 
representing the loser stocks and portfolio 10 representing the winner stocks. He then 
tested for price reversals in the subsequent month by calculating the abnormal returns 
for the winner and loser portfolios as well as the arbitrage portfolio (loser-winner). 
His result indicates that short-run contrarian strategy earned a statistically significant 
average abnormal return of 2.5% per month (t-value= 10.54) and concluded that the 
market is weak form inefficient in the short-run.  
 
Wang et al. (2004) conducted a detailed test for overreaction using data from the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets over six years from 1st August 1994 to 31st July 2000. 
They first ranked the shares in descending order based on their abnormal returns in 
week t using the conventional market-adjusted model and assigned the top 25 shares 
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to the winner portfolio and bottom 25 shares to the loser portfolio and then averaged 
the weekly abnormal returns for both portfolios. Subsequently, the performance of the 
portfolios was observed for the next 20 weeks by computing the cumulative market-
adjusted abnormal returns. They found during the rank period, winner shares 
outperformed the market by 10.74% whereas loser shares underperformed the market 
by –9.04%. During the test period, price reversals were observed especially during the 
first week as winners underperformed the market by 0.55%, while loser outperformed 
the market by 0.52% and the loser-winner portfolio earned a significant return of 
1.07%.  
 
Iihara et al. (2004) examined the winner-loser effect using stocks listed on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1975 to 1997 using the framework proposed by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) where five equally weighted portfolios ranked on past 
performance extending back to 1, 6, 12, 36 and 60 months prior to portfolio formation 
(J = 1, 6, 12, 36, 60) and held for five holding periods corresponding to each 
formation period (K = 1, 6, 12, 36, 60). They observed significant return reversal for 
all formation periods with average returns for the winner portfolio fall from 3.7% to 
1.0% and average returns of the loser portfolio rise from 0.3% to 2.3%. The loser 
portfolio returns exceeded winner portfolio returns for all horizons. 
 
Lehmann (1990) using all shares on the NYSE and the AMEX between July 
1962 and December 1986, utilized a different research methodology to prove market 
inefficiency. He formed portfolios that involved taking short positions in shares that 
had experienced recent price increases and long positions on shares that had 
experienced recent price decreases. He set the weights wi,t-k so that they are negative 
